The purpose of this paper is to apply China's economy growth prospects and its potential drivers of future. China's fast rise and its growth model have accelerated important existing structural trends in the global economy and made them decisive characteristics of the world economy. China's role in the world economy over the coming decades, an exercise which would not be possible without an investigation of the prospects for China's continued economic rise. On the one hand, China is a large export market for the United States. A lot of U.S. firms use China as the final destination of assembly in their global supply chain networks. China's huge holdings of U.S. Treasury securities support the federal government finance its budget failures. However, some analysts contend that China consolidates a number of distortive economic policies such as protectionist industrial policies and an undervalued currency that undermine U.S. economic interests.
Introduction
China's rapid economic growth has led to a substantial rise in bilateral commercial ties among many countries such as the United States. According to U.S. trade report, total trade between the two countries increased from $5 billion in 1980 to almost $562 billion in 2013. China is currently the United States' second-largest trading partner, its third-largest export retail, and its largest source of imports. A lot of U.S. firms have a large operations in China in order to sell their goods in the booming Chinese market and to take profit of lower-cost labor for export-oriented manufacturing. These operations have supported some U.S. Companies to consolidated internationally competitive and have supplied U.S. consumers with a variety of low-cost goods. China's huge-scale Glawe, L et al. (2017) developed a stylized multi-sector growth model of China's economy. Authors applied a neoclassical modeling approach and focus on the reform process under Deng Xiaoping as China's main growth driver since 1978.
A study by Ma, G et al.(2017) considers interactions between China's domestic and external imbalances and their global implications. Authors presented scenarios detailing how a rebalancing of China's growth pattern from investment-driven growth towards more consumption-driven growth may occur in practice. Using input-output tables for 2012, scholars illustrated the knife-edged nature of Chinese rebalancing, the linkages between expenditure-side and production-side rebalancing, and how an internal rebalancing could exacerbate external imbalances.
More scholars for instance, also argued that China has a population three times more than all other transition economies combined, and China's economic development in the last two decades has been nothing short of phenomenal, having overtaken Japan as the world's second-largest economy. China's future economic growth, social and political stability will undoubtedly have an unprecedented influence on the order and fiscal stability of the Chinese people.
Accoding to Liu, W. H et al. (2016) against the background of the continuously weaker economic growth in China in the past few years, the Chinese government is convinced that the Chinese economy needs to adapt itself to getting used to "the New Normal". Under "the New Normal" the Chinese economy will grow at lower rates of about 6-7% annually, whereas China would strive for substantial quality advancement that should become a core element in its future growth model in the long run. Gao, Z. (2017) points out that it has been nearly four decades since China initiated its economic reform in 1978. In spite of the fact that it brought the unprecedented economic growth to China, the reform is viewed by many as problematic, and has recently seemed to be caught in the dilemma between recession and inequity.
The author intends to explore the structural flaws of China's economic reforms in the light of modern Catholicsocial teaching, especially the basic theological principles it builds in explicating activities in political-economic spheres. On the basis of the Catholic understanding of economic liberty, market, government, and equity, the scholar also tries to provide a public theological agenda for China's economic reforms, in order to help solve the problems they are facing.
Further authors for example, Alder, S et al.(2016) 
China's Economic Growth
According to China has a population three times more than all other transition economies combined, and China's economic development in the last two decades has been nothing short of phenomenal, having overtaken Japan as the world's second-largest economy. China's future economic growth, social and political stability will undoubtedly have an unprecedented influence on the order and fiscal stability of the Chinese people. Overholt, W. H. (2016) also found that China's rapid growth and its growth model have accelerated important existing structural trends in the world economy and made them decisive characteristics of the global economy. In particular, China has ensured that this will be the era of the global market economy; the super-industrial economy; the postindustrial economy; the ecologically constrained economy; the complex economy; the highly globalized economy; the innovation economy; an economy with a new moral consciousness about the global supply chain; and an economy with an emerging new monetary system. Lin, J et al.(2016) argued that after more than three decades of unprecedented high growth at an average rate of nearly 10% per annum, China's economy has been slowing down since 2010, dropping to 6.9% in 2015, the lowest annual growth rate since 1990. As the world's largest economy in PPP terms and the second largest in terms of nominal exchange rates, such a slowdown has profound implications. Glawe, L et al. (2017) developed a stylized multi-sector growth model of China's economy. Authors applied a neoclassical modeling approach and focus on the reform process under Deng Xiaoping as China's main growth driver since 1978.
Accoding to Liu, W. H et al. (2016) against the background of the continuously weaker economic growth in China in the past few years, the Chinese government is convinced that the Chinese economy needs to adapt itself to getting used to "the New Normal". Under "the New Normal" the Chinese economy will grow at lower rates of about 6-7% annually, whereas China would strive for substantial quality advancement that should become a core element in its future growth model in the long run.
3.China's Economic Growth and Reforms: 1979-the Present
Since the establishment of economic reforms, China's economy has increased substantially faster than during the pre-reform episode. The Chinese government argues that, from 1953 to 1978, real annual GDP growth was almost 6.7%, although a lot of analysts point out that Chinese economic data during this time bring huge inquiries because Chinese government officials often exaggerated production levels for a variety of political causes.
China's economy endured economic declines during the leadership of Chairman Mao Zedong, including during the Great Leap Forward from 1958 to 1960 . Since 1979, China's average annual real GDP has increased by nearly 10% (see Figure 1 ).
This has meant that, on average, China has been strong to double the capacity of its economy in real terms every eight years.The global economic crisis, which began in 
Causes of China's Economic Growth
Many scholars generally attribute much of China's fast economic rise to two significant factors such as large-scale capital investment and fast productivity growth. These two factors emerged to have gone together. Economic reforms force to higher efficiency in the economy, which impacted profits and increased resources for further investment in the economy.According to Zhengge, T. U et al.(2016) China's economy has experienced a high-rate growth since the reform and opening up in 1978. However, some macro-statistics indicated that China's economy grows with a low efficiency. In fact, these conclusions based on macro-statistics and the performance of the economy as a whole cannot reflect the multi-level, dynamic and, therefore, complicated situation of China.
A study by Wilson, R. (2016) brings the causal relationships between quality of governance and economic growth at the provincial level in China during the post-Mao reform era.
Exploiting the wide cross-provincial variation and rapid change over time in governance institutions and economic performance in China during this period (covering 1985-2005) , Author provides a new perspective on the relationship between governance and growth.
Whereas a large body of prior literature has demonstrated a strong positive association between high-quality governance institutions and good economic performance at the cross-country level, few quantitative studies have explicitly tested the direction of causality between changes in governance quality and changes in economic outcomes.
China's three-decade infrastructure investment boom shows few signs of abating. Is China's economic growth a consequence of its purposeful investment? Is China a prodigy in delivering infrastructure from which rich democracies could learn? The prevalent view in economics literature and policies derived from it is that a high level of infrastructure investment is a precursor to economic growth. China is especially held up as a model to emulate Ansar, A et al.(2016) . Different scholar hold different views with the relationship of international capital flows and economic growth. By China international capital flows on economic growth influence the empirical analysis, this article believes that the international capital flows on economic growth exist both positive effect and negative effect Xianhong, X., Tian, C et al.(2016, December) .Despite, as China's technological improvement onset to approach that of main developed countries , its level of productivity gains, and so, real GDP rise, could slow significantly from its historic levels except China becomes a main center for advance technology and innovation and/or implements recent comprehensive economic reforms. Many developing economies practiced fast economic development and increase during the 1960s and 1970s by implementing some of the same policies that China has applied to date to develop its economy, such as measures to improve exports and to boost and secure certain industries.
However, at some size in their development, some of these countries began to experience economic stagnation over a sustained episode of time, a phenomenon described by economists as the "middle-income trap. According to a prospective of The Economist Intelligence, China's real GDP growth will slow significantly in the years along, averaging 6.1% from 2014 to 2020, and 2.3% from 2021 to 2030 (Figure 2) .
The Chinese government has points out its ambition to move away from its current economic approach of rapid growth at any cost to more " efficient" economic rise, which looks to cut down dependence on energy-intensive and high-polluting industries and rely more on high technology, green energy, and services. China also has figures out it wants to access further balanced economic growth. 
Measuring the Size of China's Economy
The fast growth of the Chinese economy has motivate a lot of scholars to figure out if and when China will overtake the United States as the "world's largest economic power." The "actual" size of China's economy has been a main subject of large-scale controversy between economists. Measured in U.S. dollars applying nominal exchange quotas, China's GDP in 2013 was $9.3 trillion, about 55% the volume of the U.S. Economy. The per capita GDP of China was $6,900, which was 18% the capacity of Japan's level and 13% that of the United States (see Table 1 ).
Many scholars argued that applying nominal exchange rates to convert Chinese data into U.S. dollars break down to provide the real volume of China's economy and living standards relative to the United States. Nominal exchange rates simply show the prices of foreign currencies with the U.S. dollar and such measurements exclude differences in the prices for goods and services across countries. Hence, one dollar exchanged for local Japanese currency would buy fewer goods and services there than it would in the United States.
The PPP exchange rate rises the measurement of China's economy and its per capita GDP.
According to the EIU, which applies World Bank data, prices for goods and services in China are about 45% the level they are in the United States. Adjusting for this price differential increases the expense of China's 2013 GDP from $9.3 trillion to $16.1 trillion .This would show that China's economy is 95.9% the volume of the U.S. economy.
China's share of global GDP on a PPP basis increased from 3.7% in 1990 to 18.2% in 2013, while the U.S. share of global GDP increased at 24.3% in 1999 and decreased to 19.0% in 2013.
Further economic analysts project that on a PPP basis China will soon overtake the United States as the world's largest economy. Brooks, S. G et al.(2016) also argued that after two and a half decades, is the United States' run as the world's sole superpower coming to an end? Many say yes, seeing a rising China ready to catch up to or even surpass the United States in the near future.According to authors by many measures, after all, China's economy is on track to become the world's biggest, and even if its growth slows, it will still outpace that of the United States for many years. (see Figure 3) , and that by 2030, China's economy could be 36.1% larger than that of the United States. This would not be the first time in history that China was the world's largest economy.The PPP measurement also raises China's 2013 nominal per capita GDP (from $6,700) to $10,940, which was 22.5% of the U.S. level. The EIU projects that, even by the year 2030, U.S. living averages will be close to three times greater than those in China.Hence, although China could become the world's largest economy in a few years on a PPP basis, it will likely take many years for its living standards to approach U.S. Levels. 
China as the World's Largest Manufacturer
China has appeared as the world's largest manufacturer according to the United Nations. Figure 4 lists figures out of the gross value added of manufacturing in China, the United States, and Japan expressed in U.S. dollars for 2004 to 2012. Gross expense added data provide the actual value of manufacturing that crop up in the country . These data show that China overtook Japan as the world's second-largest manufacturer on a gross value added basis in 2006 and the United States in 2010. In 2012, the cost of China's manufacturing on a gross value added basis was 28.2% higher than that in the United States. Manufacturing plays a considerably more important role in the Chinese economy than it does for the United States and Japan. In 2011, China's gross valued added manufacturing was equal to 30.5% of GDP, compared to 12.3% for the United States and 18.7% for Japan. 
Changes in China's Wage Advantage
China's large population and relatively low wage rates gave it a significant competitive benefit when economic readjustment and trade liberalization were first onset by the government in the late 1970s. However, this advantage emerges to be eroding as wages in by 2016, they were about 168% higher. Increasing labor expenditure are one of the major reasons why the Chinese state has focused on promoting the nation's innovation and productivity levels. 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in China
China's trade and investment reforms and incentives force to a rise in FDI onset in the early As point out in Figure 9 , China was the world's second-largest target for FDI flows in 2015. According to Chinese state data on non-financial FDI inflows, the biggest sources of cumulative FDI in China for 2009-2015 were Hong Kong (47.0%), the British Virgin Islands (BVI), Japan, the United States, and Taiwan (see Table 2 ). The biggest sources of non-financial FDI inflows into China in 2015 were Hong Kong (67% of total), Singapore, Japan, Taiwan, and the United States. According to Chinese data, annual U.S. In 2015, they were $3.4 billion or 2.9% of total FDI flows to China (see Figure 10 ).The stock of U.S. non-financial FDI in China was $74.6 billion over 2015. 
China's Commodity Trade Patterns
Economic reforms, trade and investment liberalization have supported transform China into a major trading power. Chinese commodity exports increased from $14 billion in 1979 to $ 2.2 trillion in 2013, while products imports increased from $18 billion to $1.9 trillion (see Table 4 and Figure 12) . 
China's Major Trading Partners

5.1.1.Main Chinese Trade Merchandises
China's large of low-cost labor has made it internationally ambitious in different low-cost, labor-deep manufactures. As issues, manufactured commodities constitute a significant dividend of China's market. A substantial extent of China's imports is constituted of parts and inherent that are assembled into finished commodities, for instance consumer electronic products and computers, and then exported. Usually, the value-added to such products in China by Chinese workers is relatively small compared to the total expense of the product when it is exported overseas.
China's major 10 exports and imports are listed in Table 6 and Table 7 , respectively, applying the harmonized cost scheme on a two-digit level. Main exports included electrical machinery, machinery , knit apparel, and furniture and bedding while major imports incorporated electrical machinery, mineral fuel, machinery, and ores. 
Dependence on Exporting and Fixed Investment
According to a report by IMF, fixed investment associated to trade commodities plus net exports together accounted for over 60% of China's GDP rise from 2001 to 2008, which was significantly higher than in the G -7 countries about16%, the euro zone (30%), and the rest of Asia (35%). As provided in 
6.1.Structural economic reforms
A lot of government officials have publicly stated the need for China to approach from its traditional economic growth model of growth at all cost to one that balances economic rise with a number of social goals in order to improve a "socialist harmonious society," and to further modernize the economy. Yu, H. (2017) Further, Nagaraj, R. (2017) suggests that manufacturing output grew 7%-8% annually since 1991, with a marked improvement in the variety and quality of goods produced. Yet, its share in gross domestic product has practically stagnated, with a sharp rise in import intensity. Liberal (or market-friendly) policies were expected to boost labour intensive exports and industrial growth. However, this may not use in certain areas. For instance, the transition from planned to retail economy has involved a significant shift of financial liability from state-owned firms to investors, thereby creating a huge perceived need for precautionary securing by investors to resource anticipated retirement, medical and educational cost. High saving has become a main source of imbalance in the macro economy. While this type of policies has been successful in boosting rise and productivity for a sustained period, the limitations of such policies were not properly understood between policy analysts.
6.1.1.External policies
Many scholars for example Shen, W. (2016) Since the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, China has significantly increased its foreign exchange reserves. The authors argued that the resulting abnormal levels of currency reserves accumulated by Chinese authorities are not intended to maximize the citizenry's economic welfare, as a precautionary account, but rather to forestall the elite's own political demise. This goal has been pursued mainly by generating large current account surpluses through manipulation of the yuan exchange rate Seghezza, E et al.(2017) . Liu, X et al. (2017) argued that since it embarked on its economic opening and reform path in the late 1970s, the Chinese government has assigned a central role to science, technology and innovation for the country's economic development. In the phase of 'economic catch-up', China has pursued a top-down innovation policy, characterized by targeted investments in science and technology. Recently, a significant shift in China's innovation policy can be discerned, with government increasingly acknowledging the importance of markets, private enterprises and favorable institutional conditions as determinants of a well-functioning innovation system. Prodi, G et al.(2017) found that the emergence of 'subnational innovation spaces' in China as they result from the interaction between state restructuring and the diffusion of innovative activities. Several countervailing forces have played a part in outlining a number of supra-urban regions that diverge by their own capability to develop and govern innovation-related socioeconomic processes. On the one hand, the downscaling of state power enables the local administrative units to plan place-based strategies to embed technological upgrading, such as driving indigenous innovative activities to cluster around industrial and technological parks.
The Innovation in China
Further authors for instance, found that Eco-innovation has become a core engine for long-term stable economic development, as well as a fundamental way to ease the tension between economic growth and environmental resources management.
Through the construction of a measurement index system, this paper evaluates the level of regional Eco-innovation in 30 Chinese provinces from 2000 to 2014.
However, the regional comparison of the Eco-innovation index revealed an obvious, gradually decreasing distribution pattern from east to west. Factors such as technology push, market pull, and environmental regulation pull have positive but differentiated influences on the Eco-innovation throughout China and among the eastern, central and western regions.
7.1.1.Patterns of Innovation Growth
According to Zhang, W. (2017) the last 30 years of high growth rates were primarily China's latecomer advantage unleashed by reform and opening. This latecomer advantage provided entrepreneurs with tremendous opportunities for arbitrage. It is the arbitrage activities of entrepreneurs (both Chinese and foreign) that caused a gradual increase in the efficiency of resource allocation, and thus drove high rates of economic growth. However, as the gap between China and developed countries has decreased, the room for arbitrage is shrinking. Solely relying on arbitrage entrepreneurs will no longer sustain high rates of economic growth.
A recent study by Chen, Z et al.(2017) also investigated the relationship between imports and innovation by importing firms. We first construct a theoretical model in which imports stimulate innovation through cost-reducing knowledge spillovers. We then employ a combined micro dataset of Chinese manufacturing firms to estimate the effects of imported intermediates on the firm's R&D investment.
More scholars for instance Cheng, Y et al.(2017) also argued that the increasingly large role of financial intermediaries in promoting firms' innovation and internationalization has led to great research interest. China has faced mounting pressure to take entrepreneurial finance and innovation seriously. Little is known about entrepreneurial financiers' activities and performance. Focusing on entrepreneurial financiers' activities in the Yangtze River Economic Belt, authors investigated how they select projects and how well they perform in China. Evidence shows that various financiers serve in the financial system to nurture innovative entrepreneurial activities; they tend to focus on technology, and the major financiers vary with stage of industrial technological development.
Further study by Zhao, C et al. (2017) The technological regime of sectors affects the chance for latecomers to catch up, but the final outcomes also depend on the actions of governments and firms. A successful catch-up requires the growth of indigenous firms rather than dependence on foreign direct investment. The government has an important role, but different forms of intervention across sectors must be identified.
A lot of scholars for example, Wonglimpiyarat, J et al.(2017) are concerned with China's strategies in remodelling itself towards an innovation-driven economy. In particular, the study is focused on exploring the policies and innovation strategies to support high-tech SMEs in China. The authors have shown that the Chinese government has introduced many policy initiatives (government intervention policies) after the country joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, the country still needs policies to improve interactions among institutions within the innovation system.
According to Shcherbiak, A. (2017) , China's recent economic growth has turned the country into one of the major players in the global economy. However, the benefits of that growth have not been evenly distributed among the population. As the growth rate is losing its double-digit power, the economy is transitioning into innovation-driven growth that prioritizes science and technology development over mass production. Qu, Y et al.(2017) investigated the role of regional formal institutions in the innovation process in Chinese enterprises. The authors suggested that regional formal institutions (reflected by government support), financial institutions, educational institutions and taxation institutions promote innovation in Chinese firms, while they fail to discover such an impact from legal institutions. Also, regional formal institutions positively moderate Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) spillovers on process innovation.
Misallocation of Innovation Resources
Many researchers for example, Li, H. C et al.(2017) sound an alarm about disparate efficiency among China's regions in the allocation of innovation inputs.
A theoretical measure of misallocation is adopted to gauge the distortions that exacerbate the inefficiency of resource allocations across geographic innovation units; these units' energy inputs are more productive than coal and coal-related fuels. Non-coal energy is more environmentally friendly but more expensive than coal-related fuels. Using the model estimates, authors conduct Wald tests on whether the marginal productivity of labor and energy significantly differ from their respective factor costs.
Conclusion
After more than three decades of high rise that was focused on an exploration of its low-wage profit and almost positive demographic pattern in correlation with market-oriented reforms and openness to the global economy, China is at a change with a significant higher practice and a shrinking work force. Prospective growth by necessity would have to depend more on its capacity to achieve productivity rise, and national innovation will be an important part of it. In this paper, we assess the likelihood that China can make the necessary transition. Applying data on investment, and patent applications, receipts, and citations, we figure out that the Chinese economy has become increasingly innovative, including reforms. In terms of drivers of innovation growth, we find that embracing expanded retail opportunities in the world economy and responding to boosting labor costs are two leading contributing causes. Further, we find clue of resource misallocation in the innovation area: Although state-owned companies earn further subsidies, private companies exhibit extra innovation outcome. Innovation can presumably progress even faster if resource misallocation can be undertake.
We have point out that Chinese companies have demonstrated a capacity to become more innovative in response to conduct pressure and global opportunities. The data on Chinese patents, both from a quantity and a quality future, occur encouraging enough that there is no reason to be overly pessimistic about China's prospects for a prosperity transition to a more innovationbased growth approach. If China finds efficient measures to bring a transformation to a more innovative economy, it can materialize its dream faster of moving into the high-income . The Chinese government subsidies contribute to favor state-owned companies, and yet both national private sector firms and foreign invested firms are more effective in transforming expenditure in R&D to innovation issues as measured by patents. Leveling the playing field for firms of all ownership type, limiting the government's discretion in subsidies for research and development, and secure that private sector firms have a fair chance at receiving those subsidies would cut down resource misallocation and enhance adaptability.
